Detail publikace

StrongChain: Transparent and Collaborative Proof-of-Work Consensus

HOMOLIAK, I.

Originální název

StrongChain: Transparent and Collaborative Proof-of-Work Consensus

Typ

článek ve sborníku ve WoS nebo Scopus

Jazyk

angličtina

Originální abstrakt

Bitcoin is the most successful cryptocurrency so far. This is mainly due to its novel consensus algorithm, which is based on proof-of-work combined with a cryptographically-protected data structure and a  rewarding scheme that incentivizes nodes to participate. However, despite its unprecedented success Bitcoin suffers from many inefficiencies. For instance, Bitcoin's consensus mechanism has been proved to be incentive-incompatible, its high reward variance causes centralization, and its hardcoded deflation raises questions about its long-term sustainability. In this work, we revise the Bitcoin consensus mechanism by proposing StrongChain, a scheme that introduces transparency and incentivizes participants to collaborate rather than to compete. The core design of our protocol is to reflect and utilize the computing power aggregated on the blockchain which is invisible and "wasted" in Bitcoin today. Introducing relatively easy, although important changes to Bitcoin's design enables us to improve many crucial aspects of Bitcoin-like cryptocurrencies making it more secure, efficient, and profitable for participants. We thoroughly analyze our approach and we present an implementation of StrongChain. The obtained results confirm its efficiency, security, and deployability.

Klíčová slova

Bitcoin, proof-of-work, selfish mining, timestamp accuracy

Autoři

HOMOLIAK, I.

Vydáno

14. 8. 2019

Místo

Santa Clara

ISBN

978-1-939133-06-9

Kniha

Proceedings of The 28th USENIX Security Symposium

Strany od

819

Strany do

836

Strany počet

18

URL

https://www.usenix.org/system/files/sec19-szalachowski.pdf

BibTex

@inproceedings{BUT162600,
  author="Ivan {Homoliak}",
  title="StrongChain: Transparent and Collaborative Proof-of-Work Consensus",
  booktitle="Proceedings of The 28th USENIX Security Symposium",
  year="2019",
  pages="819--836",
  address="Santa Clara",
  isbn="978-1-939133-06-9",
  url="https://www.usenix.org/system/files/sec19-szalachowski.pdf"
}