Detail publikace

Nice "Prisoners": Experimental Evidence of Cooperation in Single-Trial and Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma

VESELÝ, Š.

Originální název

Nice "Prisoners": Experimental Evidence of Cooperation in Single-Trial and Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma

Typ

článek v časopise - ostatní, Jost

Jazyk

angličtina

Originální abstrakt

The task of the experimental study reported here is to compare the amount of cooperation in the single-trial Prisoner's Dilemma game and in the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game. We confirmed that subjects (N=45) in iterated Prisoner's Dilemma games were more cooperative than subjects in single-trial games. We also found that there is less cooperation on the last move of an iterated game than there is in single-trial games. Theoretically speaking, defection is strictly dominant in single-trial games, as well as in games with known finite end. Empirically these predictions are usually not met, and were not met in our study. We offer reasons why this might be so – specifically, we discuss heuristic decision making rules that might account for cooperation in single-trial games.

Klíčová slova

Prisoner's Dilemma, game theory, decision making, cooperation, heuristics, behavioural economics

Autoři

VESELÝ, Š.

Rok RIV

2012

Vydáno

12. 3. 2012

ISSN

1803-3865

Periodikum

Econ... Vysoká škola báňská -Technická univerzita Ostrava AH AE

Ročník

21

Číslo

1

Stát

Česká republika

Strany od

203

Strany do

212

Strany počet

10

BibTex

@article{BUT90490,
  author="Štěpán {Veselý}",
  title="Nice {"}Prisoners{"}: Experimental Evidence of Cooperation in Single-Trial and Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma",
  journal="Econ... Vysoká škola báňská -Technická univerzita Ostrava AH AE",
  year="2012",
  volume="21",
  number="1",
  pages="203--212",
  issn="1803-3865"
}